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Abstract 
The Institutional Model of Decentralization (IMD) is elaborated and used to explain two 
things: first, how the hypothesized improvements in efficiency and growth after 
decentralization may fail to materialize; second, how the interplay among economic, 
administrative and institutional factors affect the welfare outcome of decentralization, 
given the widespread local capture following political decentralization. Rather than 
exerting direct effects, however, the mechanism is complex, involving intangibles and 
feedback effects. When applied to actual cases in some regions, a particular method 
capable of capturing complex inter-relations and quantifying intangibles is therefore used. 
It is revealed that people’s participation plays the most critical role in reducing capture 
while simultaneously maximizing welfare. As the quality of local leaders is found to be 
decisive in influencing the outcome, a typology of leaders is subsequently constructed.  
Keywords: institutional factors, participation, decentralization, welfare, local capture 
Introduction 
Decentralization is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, encompassing several 
interconnected aspects. Its theoretical supports originate in the informational advantage 
and coordination (policy enforcement) capability of local government. Although 
informational advantage can be secured by adopting a pro-market policy, a market system 
alone may not be sufficient to establish an effective coordination at the local level unless 
the decision making is decentralized. A more decentralized system, particularly on fiscal 
front, is also superior for promoting economic growth (United Nations 1991, Oates 1994, 
Bruno and Pleskovic 1996).1 No wonder the World Bank embraced decentralization as one 
of the major governance reforms on its agenda (World Bank 2000, Burki–Perry–
Dillinger1999).  
Yet, the experience in many countries shows that the performance after decentralization 
has not always been consistent with the promise. Growth can be lower, and overall welfare 
conditions may not improve, if not worsen. Imperfections in local provision and poorly 
trained local bureaucrats are among the suggested reasons (Prud’homme 1994, Tanzi 
 
a Asian Development Bank, E-mail: iazis@adb.org ; and Cornell University 213 West Sibley Hall Ithaca, NY 14853, USA, 
E-mail: ija1@cornell.edu  
1 Other justifications for decentralization include: raising efficiency through reduced transaction costs, diffusing social and 
political tensions, strengthening people’s participation, and ensuring political and cultural autonomy.  
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2002). Problems due to lack of coordination in extracting bribes at the local level can also 
lead to ‘excess’ rent extraction (Shleifer–Vishny 1993), although some argued that 
corruption should be more difficult to commit under decentralization (Huther–Shah 1998). 
The most significant risk of decentralization is the spread of local capture especially in 
regions with a high degree of income disparity. Although the verdict regarding the relative 
proneness of local and national governments is still out (Bardhan–Mookherjee 2005), in 
general the likelihood of capture by elites is greater at the local than at the national level. 
The possibility of power sharing between contesting parties is typically smaller at the local 
than at the national level. Some analysts consequently suggest that the justification for 
decentralization should be based on the political economy explanation (Besley–Coate 
1999), and to be successful decentralization should entail democratic, fiscal, and 
administrative components (Manor 1999, Binswanger 1999). 
There are a large number of studies on fiscal federalism and administrative 
decentralization (transfer of authority to local governments). Literature on institutional 
economics dealing with political decentralization are also numerous. Yet, theoretical and 
empirical work on how these different dimensions interact to affect growth and welfare is 
curiously scanty. By using the Institutional Model of Decentralization (IMD), in this paper 
I try to delineate the interactions between institutions, regional growth and a more broadly-
defined welfare.2 The starting point is to delve into the theoretical concept of regional 
incentives by way of comparing ‘rewards’ and ‘punishment’ for adopting growth-
enhancing policy. Once the basic concept is established, a greater variety of institutional 
factors to reflect the property of local accountability are introduced, ranging from local 
capture, people’s participation, initial conditions, and the quality of local leaders. 
Incorporating these factors in the analysis of decentralization constitutes the essence of 
IMD. The empirical application based on a series of field surveys in one of the emerging 
economies that went through a major decentralization programme is discussed in the last 
Section.          
Incentives for Regional Growth: Rewards and Punishment 
The basic premise of decentralization-growth nexus is that local governments are more 
efficient at providing infrastructure and public services compared to the higher levels of 
government (Oates 1972). Greater efficiency is thus at the centre of the relation between 
decentralization and higher rates of economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez–McNab 2003); 
however, overall efficiency is not always aligned with private efficiency. With enhanced 
authority after decentralization, local leaders may put private benefits above social 
benefits, depending on how they perceive the implication on their probability of staying in 
 
2 Institutional Model of Decentralization (IMD) was first explained in Azis (2008) and elaborated further in Azis (2010). 
One of the consequential issues that emerged in IMD is the relation between policy and institutions. Negative welfare effect can 
be the result of wrong policies, but it can also be the product of right policies with wrong institutions. In some cases, policy 
matters more than institution (Henry–Miller 2008), in others institution matters more (Rodrik–Subramania–Trebbi 2002, 
Easterly–Levine 2002). Referring to the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, Sachs (2003) argues that institution matters but not for 
everything.  
REGIONAL STATISTICS, 2013, VOL. 3: 3–29
COMPLEX INTERPLAY OF FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF DECENTRALIZATION 5 
power. When private benefit rules, incentives to foster growth become secondary, and 
when private motives produce a detrimental impact on regional resources, growth falters. 
Let gp = probability that local government stays in power if it fosters growth; and cp
= probability that local government stays in power if it kills growth by intensifying local 
capture. The latter could occur because local governments have had few incentives either 
to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; 
and Shleifer & Treisman, 2005 for the case of Russia). Denote C  for the benefits accrued 
to local officials through local capture; and rR for regional-own revenues, the size of 
which is determined by the local rates that include both tax rates and other revenue 
collection rates,  , and regional output rY . The share of central government revenues 
(from additional growth) going to local governments is denoted by α. Thus, Yt.. is the 
actual revenue received by local governments where Yt.  is central government’s total 
revenue. How much local government will value growth is therefore proportional to 
Yt.. . Central government can use  as the “carrot” in promoting regional growth. 
Define cg ppPROB , the value of which depends on whether local officials are 
appointed (by the centre) or locally elected. If they are appointed, then the centre can 
presumably choose PROB  freely and make it as high as it wants. If they are elected 
locally, the outcome depends on the ability of central government to affect the outcome of 
the election, e.g., not endorsing specific candidates. Thus, the centre can use PROB  as 
the “stick.” If, however, the centre has little control over the election outcome, and capture 
becomes an important factor, PROB  may be less than unity, i.e., local government may 
be more likely reelected if it kills growth than if it fosters it. Local governments chooses 
growth only if the incentive is higher than the incentive to obtain private benefits from 
local capture:3 
CpRYtp crg .)...(     (1) 
or  
CYYtPROB r  )....(    (2) 
Another way to put it, local governments are more likely to choose growth under the 
following conditions: stronger “stick” (higher PROB ), larger “carrot” (higher  ), 
higher national growth potential (higher Y ), more effective generation of national tax 
revenues (higher t ), and higher local-own revenues rY. . On the other hand, one can also 
focus on the efforts to lower private benefits from local capture, C , by attacking the 
negative factors such as corruption, weak legal system, and ineffective law enforcement.  
The above formula provides a way of identifying a set of policies without singling out 
“non-economic factors” often cited just for convenience. In reality, not all countries can 
alter policies for either historical or political reasons. In such a case, the focus can be 
directed towards exploring new instruments to complement the existing ones.  Take the 
case of  . It is important to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post  . If central and 
 
3 Social benefits (e.g., enhanced growth and welfare) and private benefits (e.g., resources appropriated for private use) can 
be generated simultaneously. Put in the context of motivation and incentive to obtain benefits, social and private benefits can be 
in a competitive mode. That is, local leaders’ incentive to obtain private benefits from local capture may either forgo or exceed 
the incentive to obtain social benefits. Alternatively, the reverse may hold as in inequality (2): i.e., local leaders’ incentive to 
obtain social benefits (e.g., from enhanced growth and welfare) exceeds the incentive to obtain private benefits.   
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regional governments can commit to a tax-sharing schedule or to a particular arrangement 
of centre-local transfer, the two will be the same. But if central government desperately 
needs funds to keep down its deficit, the ex-ante   may be higher than the ex-post  . 
The one which is relevant to local governments' decisions is the ex-post  . If a proportion 
of national revenues has been fixed, a new fraction of revenues, say  , can be introduced. 
The point being that central government can control a policy instrument that will function 
as the “carrot”: 
CYYtYPROB rr  ]..).)(.[(     (3) 
One could erroneously imply that by raising  , ceteris-paribus, growth incentives 
could be enhanced; however, higher   can deter investment and growth of rY by 
discouraging investors to come and do business in the region (see also footnote 4). Thus, 
the level of rY can be inversely related to the size of  .  
Assuming no income leakage, consider the following: 
),,( rrrrr NLKYY         (4) 
where Kr, Lr, and Nr are capital, labour and other inputs, respectively. Decomposing the 
regional capital stock into: (a) initial stock adjusted by the depreciation rate )1(0 rK ; 
and (b) the regional investment flow rK , and considering that rK  
is inversely related to the regional tax and other revenue rates  ; that is,  )(fK r   
where 0)(  f , the total regional-own revenue is:  
},)],()1({[. 0
rrrrr NLfKYR       (5) 
A fundamental growth equation is thus obtained by combining (3) and (5): 
C]}N,L)),(f)1(K[(Y.Y.t).)Y(.{(PROB rrr0
rr     (6)4 
Consequently, central government can use the “stick” ( PROB  and C ) and the 
“carrot” ( ,  ) to foster growth. Note also from (6), that a growth-oriented strategy at 
the national level (higher Y ) can help fulfil the inequality. Without a stick-and-carrot 
system, the incentives for local leaders to obtain private benefits through local capture can 
be greater than the incentives to foster growth. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of regional development goes beyond just growth.  
A broadly-defined welfare should be more appropriate to use. The problem is that once a 
multi-dimensional goal is considered, various trade-offs emerge, where different 
institutional factors play different roles in affecting welfare. A further complication 
appears with respect to the complex relations between local capture and the goal, where 
institutions including capture interact among themselves as well as with welfare. To 
 
4 Two important points worth noting. Since increased capital is often accompanied by increased imports (income leakage), the 
true Rr is likely lower than that stated in (5). Notice also that if local governments fervently want to raise  , regional-own 
revenues may at first increase. As regional investment begins to be affected adversely by higher  , total revenues will decline. 
Thus, the policy choice concerning    depends on the initial condition. If the current   is so high that it lies to the right of 
optimal  * (defined as   that gives the highest level of Rr), raising it further will kill growth. Reducing  * under such 
circumstances will raise not only the regional-own revenues but also investment flows and hence growth.  
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establish such a more realistic system where institutions are endogenous, requires a model 
framework beyond just the fundamental growth equation as in (6). This task is taken next.  
Endogenous Institutions and Regional Welfare 
Theoretical Framework 
Rules, organizations, beliefs, internalized norms, and implied regularity of behaviours, 
which constitute “institution”, define the incentive structure of societies and economies 
(North 1993, 1995). The system is in equilibrium if the implied regularity of behaviours to 
follow the rules are best-responses to the beliefs and internalized norms that are formed by 
the implied regularity of behaviours (Greif 2006).5 Many policies may fail to achieve their 
objectives because the institution in which these policies or rules were elements, was not 
in equilibrium.6 It is therefore important to understand how various institutions interact 
among themselves and how the interactions influence the welfare outcome. 
Figure 1 
How Local Capture Affects Welfare: Full Framework 
 
A framework capturing the interplay of institutional factors is shown in Figure 1. 
Decentralization policy (D) with direct election for local leaders generates ‘local capture’ 
 
5 Persistence or inertia, institutional path dependence, or steady-state equilibrium in institutional setting are among the terms 
used to describe the study of endogenous institutional change.   
6 Equilibrium in a more practical term means that there is no individual or a group of individuals that has an incentive to 
deviate from an agreement or what is previously agreed. In other words, an institution that is in equilibrium consists of rules in 
which targeted individuals have incentives to follow the rules. Thus, a law regulating issuance of driving licenses may not be 
effective because bribing public officials renders it more profitable and time-saving.   
D = Decentralization 
L = Local capture 
W = Welfare effect of decentralization 
S = Initial welfare condition 
P = People’s participation 
Q = Quality of leader 
F = Size of local budget 
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(L). However, the effect of L on local welfare (W) varies: in some regions the effect is 
positive (“positive local capture”), in others it results in a “negative local capture.” Among 
various factors that determine the effect of L on W, three stand out: initial welfare condition 
(S), people’s participation (P), and size of local budget (F). Note that the resulting W 
determines the subsequent level of initial condition S, that is, the steady-state level of initial 
welfare is influenced by any perturbations in the system that lead to changes in W, hence 
S in the subsequent period. The implied mechanisms also explicate the persistent gap 
between poor and rich regions observed in many countries. 
The key question is how the interplay of all these factors influences the way local 
capture influences welfare. The extent and severity of accountability problems and local 
capture depend on the following factors: (1) Pre-existing distribution of power at the local 
level, e.g., allocation of social and economic power within communities; (2) Lobby and 
campaign contributions by wealthier groups; (3) Fairness and regularity of elections; and 
(4) Transparency in local decision-making processes. Establishing these conditions may 
require institutional and bureaucratic reforms, yet it is precisely this type of reform that is 
the most difficult to conduct. Overcoming institutional factors is always more difficult than 
choosing the policy itself. It is complicated, involving a strong path-dependence, and often 
frustrating. Absence of this reform, however, a higher local capture almost certainly 
produces lower benefits of decentralization.  
Literature on institutional perspectives stresses the importance of participatory process. 
The degree of political participation differs between countries and regions. One of the most 
determining factors is the initial welfare condition or social structure represented, among 
others, by the human development index (HDI) and the level of poverty and income 
inequality. Greater inequality and a larger proportion of the poor imply a smaller fraction 
of informed voters or lower political awareness, i.e., upward mobility at the end tends to 
raise political awareness more significantly than at the higher end (concavity). When 
awareness is low, critical voices and the process of check-and-balance are constrained. 
This can limit the quality of public services and the welfare outcome of decentralization in 
general (Azis 2010).  
These are all associated with the quality factors. Each of them can be adversely affected 
by the intensity of local capture. While quality is important, the number and size of 
activities (e.g., public services) also influence the overall performance. The quantity that 
local government can generate depends not only on the budget size but also on the 
management of it.7 Ironically, under some circumstances, the size of the budget can be 
positively affected by local capture, that is, if local leader is of Type-A (to be explained 
later), and local elites are powerful and wealthy. Under such circumstances, local policy 
makers can operate using resources in excess of the official budget. Thus, given quality 
factors, greater local capture can still be welfare-improving (relation e2 in Figure 1).  
To reiterate the key problem, it is important to understand how the spread of local 
capture (L) during an election determines the welfare outcome of decentralization (W). 
 
7  Revenue decentralization and central-local financial transfer without clear expenditure assignment are likely inconsistent 
with “money follow function” principle. They are not welfare enhancing, especially when the capacity of budget management is 
limited and are prone to corruption and overprovision.  
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More particularly, how the effect is influenced by the extent of people’s participation (P), 
the initial level of welfare (S), and the size of local budget (F). As argued earlier, the extent 
of participation is influenced by the initial welfare through informed voters and high 
political awareness.   
Based on the analysis of implied behaviours in a coordination game (see Azis 2010 and 
Azis–Wiharja 2009), the role of leaders’ quality (Q) is critical. However, in reality, the 
effect of L on W associated with Q can be ambiguous; some leaders are able to take 
advantage of capture to augment local budget (Type-A leader), others may fail to do so 
(Type-B); see relation e8.8 Also, in some cases local leaders are effective in motivating 
local citizens to participate in most development programmes, while in others this may not 
be the case (relation e7). 
The dynamics is captured among others through relation e9. For example, low initial 
welfare (S) as a result of negative local capture will negatively affect W and S in the 
subsequent period. Through relation e5, this may be associated with a low level of 
participation (P), creating a persistent evolution of low-welfare states and low-quality 
institutions (endogenous institutions). The possibility that local capture can generate 
positive welfare effects provides a more complex yet useful analysis with direct policy 
implications. It can be shown, for example, that policies to enable greater participation are 
superior to others because the welfare effect is higher given a level of capture.  
Local capture L, participation P, and initial welfare S (poverty and inequality) represent 
the quality component of institutions. The size of local budget F, on the other hand, 
represents the quantity. Consider the following general form of welfare function:  
),,,((.) FPSLWW     (7) 
Under a standard condition,  
;0L
(.)W   ;0S(.)W   ;0P(.)W   .0F(.)W   
Since F is affected by L, decomposing (7) into quality and quantity components: 
W(.) = H(L, S, P).(F(L)  (8) 
where L
(.)H   and L)L(F   are marginal  quality and quantity, respectively.  
Taking the derivative of (8): 
)L(FL
(.)H(.)HL
F
L
(.)W   (9)  
In most cases, .0L
(.)H   However, a good quality leader capable of motivating 
participation (relation e7) may generate ,0L
(.)H   making the sign of L(.)H 
indeterminate.  
 
8 It is wrong to suggest that the central and the provincial governments should retreat into minimalist role. On the contrary, 
they should play an activist role in conducting the necessary reforms. It is also the responsibility of the centre to facilitate 
institutional supports for a successful decentralization. These include supplying technical services toward building local capacity, 
promoting mobilization of people in local participatory development, helping to set quality standards, auditing and evaluation, 
providing supra-local support to local finance (including being responsible in the coordination efforts to optimize externalities 
across regions), and investing, when necessary jointly with local government, in infrastructure.  
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As discussed earlier, on the quantity side, the effect of local capture can be negative or 
positive depending on the type of local leader (relation e2). If local leader is of a favourable 
type (Type-A), e.g., motivated to foster regional welfare by augmenting the size of local 
budget available for development, the first term of equation 9 can be positive. Otherwise, 
it will be negative (Type-B). Thus, from quantity and quality perspectives the net effect of 
rising local capture on welfare depends on the quality of local leader (Q).  
While the signs of L
(.)H   and L)L(F   are uncertain, somewhere in between 
there exists a critical value of H(.) and F(.) such that the effect of rising local capture leads 
to  
.0L
(.)W   
When this occurs, the system produces a backward-bending curve that generates 
multiple equilibria as shown in Figure 2.9  
Figure 2 
Local Capture and Welfare: Alternative Strategies 
 
The goal is either to raise W given local capture L, or, minimize local capture L given 
W. The latter is equivalent to finding lowest L along the vertical line P. Reducing income 
inequality and poverty will facilitate such a goal since shifting the bending curve leftward 
will guarantee a new equilibrium with lower intensity of local capture (e.g., N1 and N2 in 
the left panel of Figure 2).10  
An alternative strategy to insure a low capture is to raise participation; this is depicted 
by a rightward shift of the vertical line P in the right panel of Figure 2. This turns out to be 
 
9 Note that participation (P) is independent of capture. Many studies have revealed that participation is influenced by factors 
such as socio-culturally prescribed family (household heads, spouses, age range), and gender roles (married woman with 
children); see Beard (2005). While defining participation is not easy, at least the following elements should be entailed: 
representation, empowerment, benefits for all, and poverty reduction (Blair 2000). 
10 Recall that lower inequality and poverty tend to raise political awareness that can reduce the intensity of local capture. 
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superior as it produces not only lower capture supported by greater accountability, but also 
higher welfare.  
To complement the above analysis of quality component, a corresponding typology of 
local leaders is constructed, in which alternative behaviours of leaders with respect to 
quantity component (local budget) is taken into account (see Table 1). Although the main 
sources of regional revenues are central grant and local taxes, local leaders may find 
additional sources from local capture, L ϵ [0,1], where L=0 means no local capture and 
L=1 indicates that the region is fully captured (“owned” by elites). The presence of local 
capture can result in an increase, a decrease, or an unchanged local budget, depending on 
how local leaders use the additional resources. Type-A leader will take advantage of the 
capture to increase the amount of local resources beyond the official budget.  
A “Complete progress” is achieved when participation and/or initial welfare condition is 
high, and at the same time local leader is of Type-A. If ,0L
(.)H   even with a  
type-A leader, the expected outcome is “Incomplete progress,” confirming the key role of 
participation and initial conditions. Type-B leader leaves the local budget unchanged for 
any degree of local capture, while Type-C leader has a strong tendency to appropriate local 
funds either for private benefits or to exercise “return-the-favour” behaviour. Either way, 
it reduces the amount of local resources available for development purposes.   
Table 1 
Typology of Local Leader and Decentralization Outcome 
 
To reflect the dynamic implications of this theoretical exposition, specific functions 
with assigned numerical values are needed. As shown in the next Sub-section, to 
understand better the interactions among institutional factors and how the interplay can 
influence welfare, a series of sensitivity analysis are conducted using the example of a 
specific welfare function.  
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Welfare Function: An Example 
Reiterating equation 8, the welfare function is decomposed into quantity and quality 
components. Ft(L) denotes the quantity component under different local leader types 
(t=A,B,C), where FA’(L)>0, FB'(L)=0, and FC'(L)<0. Ideally, the entire amount of funds 
acquired through local capture is added to the local budget, i.e., local budget equals to 
central grant plus local taxes plus the funds acquired from local capture. The value of F(L) 
is indexed as the fraction of how the value of real amount of local budget deviates from its 
ideal amount. Suppose different types of local leader takes the following functions:  
Type-A: 3c21A Lcc)L(F  where 0<c1, c2, c3 < 1 and 0 < c1+c2<1 (10) 
Type-B: 1B c)L(F  where 0<c1 < 1    (11) 
Type-C: 3c21C Lcc)L(F  where 0<c1, c2, c3 < 1 and 0 < c1–c2<1 (12) 
Consider Type A: F(L)=0.6+0.3 √L; Type B: F(L)=0.6; Type C: F(L)=0.6-0.3√L. Plots 
of Type-A, Type-B, and Type-C local leaders are illustrated in Figure 3.   
Figure 3 
Plots of Type-A, Type-B, and Type-C local leaders 
 
 
 
On the quality component, participation is one of the critical factors. Since lower initial 
welfare (labelled S in Figure 1) implies a smaller fraction of informed voters or lower 
political awareness, and hence lower participation (P) is an increasing function of initial 
welfare (S). Moreover, an increase of initial welfare at a lower level tends to raise 
participation more significantly than at a higher level (concavity). Given population, the 
degree of people’s participation is P ϵ [0,1]. Furthermore, the initial welfare is indexed 
such that S ϵ [0,1] where S=0 implies zero welfare and S=1 indicates perfect welfare. An 
example of participation function is as follows 
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P(S)=Sc     (13) 
where 0<c<1 indicates the speed of increase in participation as S increases. The 
participation curves for some values of c are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
Participation and Initial Welfare 
 
 
Given (13), the quality component of welfare H(P,L,S) can be reduced to H(P,L). 
Indexing quality factors, H ϵ [0,1] it is specified that H=0 means no participation for any 
values of L, and H=1 indicates full participation. Consider the quality function of the 
following form  
3
2
2b
b
)bL(LaP)L,P(H 1    (14) 
Parameter a (0<a<1) denotes the region’s business climate, where a larger value reflects 
a more conducive business environment, and parameter b1 denotes an index of income 
inequality (e.g. GINI index). Parameter b2 measures the sensitivity of welfare on income 
inequality (b1), while b3 measures the efficiency and effectiveness of local government’s 
management. The latter is associated with administrative decentralization, which is one of 
the three dimensions of decentralization (Filippetti and Sacchi, 2013).  
Assigning the following values to the above equation, a=0.1, b1=0.5, b2=0.7, and 
b3=0.25, and participation is P=0.3, if equations 10, 11 and 12 take the following forms,  
Type-A: L3.06.0)L(FA    (10a) 
Type-B: 6.0)L(FB     (11a) 
Type-C: L3.06.0)L(FC    (12a) 
the plot of welfare function along L ϵ [0,1] can be derived as shown in Figure 5. The shape 
of the curve is very similar to that in Figure 2, implying multiple equilibria, but different 
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shapes obviously can be generated using different forms of welfare function and different 
values of parameters.   
Figure 5 
Multiple Equilibria 
 
To the extent that the post-decentralization performance depends on the region’s ability 
to attract business activity, even with high local capture, if the size of parameter a is large 
and the local leader is of Type-A, welfare tends to improve. Only at an extremely high 
level of capture does  welfare starts to decline, albeit slightly. Such a pattern is independent 
of the level of participation (P), and to some extent also independent of the business 
climate.  Of course, higher participation is likely to generate greater welfare (left panel of 
Figure 6).  
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Figure 6 
Sensitivity Analysis: Business Climate 
  
If the region fails to create a favourable business climate,  at a low range of capture 
welfare tends to decline as the degree of capture increases. The relation turns 
complimentary (higher capture produces higher welfare) when local capture is relatively 
high but not extremely high. This is because the “quantity” factors in equation 8 become 
more dominant, such that for Type-A leader, the funds and other resources acquired from 
the capture tend to augment local budget. This pattern is not affected by the level of 
participation (P). The right panel of Figure 6 shows that along the P-axis higher 
participation produces higher welfare.  
The ability of local leaders to influence people’s participation depends on the prevailing 
social and political structure. In the model, the income inequality (GINI index, where 0 < 
b1 < 1) is used as a proxy for such a structure. To evaluate the role of this index in the 
capture-welfare nexus, one has to consider the sensitivity of the highest achievable welfare 
to the degree of local capture. There are two possible scenarios: highest welfare can be 
achieved with lower capture, and highest welfare can be achieved only if local capture is 
high. Obviously, the former is more desirable, at least in a moral sense. Using b2 to reflect 
this condition, low b2 is more ideal than high b2 (0 < b2 <1).  
In an ideal situation (low b2), when income inequality is low, a higher welfare can still 
be achieved even with growing local capture. But this is only up to a certain point 
(L = 0.5). Beyond that point, local leaders cannot afford to maintain the level of welfare, 
presumably because they are compelled to return the favour of local elites who supported 
their candidacy. Under this scenario, a small increase of participation can significantly 
improve local welfare. As participation continues to grow, improvements taper off 
(concavity).  While a similar pattern is also observed in a high inequality environment 
(high b1), welfare improvements are more sensitive to the interplay of capture and 
participation. Only with a higher participation can the same level of capture  result in a 
higher welfare (compare the two panels in Figures 7).    
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Figure 7 
Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare is Less Sensitive to Social Structure (Income Inequality) 
  
Consider the case where the social structure plays a very significant role in determining 
welfare (high b2). When income inequality is low (small b1), welfare may first increase 
with growing capture until it reaches the peak. As local capture becomes more widespread, 
welfare starts to fall. The highest welfare is thus achieved when local capture is limited. 
This applies irrespective of the level of participation (right panel of Figure 8). On the other 
hand, if income inequality is high, welfare tends to be lower given the whole range of 
participation. At a certain level of capture, welfare improvements will take place only if 
the level of participation increases. Like in the previous low b2 scenario, the interplay of 
capture and participation clearly has an important role in determining the level of welfare; 
more so than in the case of low inequality (compare the two panels in Figure 8).   
Figure 8 
Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare is Sensitive to Social Structure (Income Inequality) 
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The impact of administrative decentralization is best explained by varying the size of 
b3 to reflect the different management quality of local government. Given a level of 
participation, when local capture increases, welfare can move in either direction depending 
on the extent to which local leaders are capable of managing their tasks efficiently (getting 
things done) and effectively (getting things done to worthwhile effect).11 The closer b3 to 
unity (0 < b3 < 1), the better is the quality of local management.  
Depicted in the left panel of Figure 9, when b3 is relatively low (set at 0.35), and local 
capture is also relatively small, within a certain range, welfare and capture move in the 
opposite direction: higher capture causes welfare to decrease, albeit slightly.  
As capture reaches a very high level, the relation between the two becomes complimentary. 
While a similar pattern is observed if the quality of local government’s management is 
good, the welfare outcome is generally better (right panel of Figure 9).  
Figure 9 
Sensitivity Analysis: Quality of Local Government’s Management 
 
A Case Study 
The results of applying the above IMD are discussed in this Section. The approach taken 
was by conducting a field survey to measure the intensity of the complex interrelations 
among institutional factors depicted in Figure 1. The ultimate purpose of the survey is to 
generate a consistent ranking of the three factors (participation P; local budget F; and initial 
conditions Q) in IMD by treating the complex interplay of different factors. Given the 
complexity and intangible factors involved, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the 
Analytic Network Process (ANP) were used, the detail of which is discussed in the 
Appendix. The field survey was conducted in seven regions throughout Indonesia over the 
 
11 Busy and seemingly efficient operations do not always produce the best outcome. Less-busy ones may indicate that the 
local government is in control and know what to do to provide the best services to the people. 
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period of 2008-2009.12 One way to structure the relations among institutional factors and 
the welfare effect of decentralization is by placing all the relevant factors in a hierarchy, 
where the highest level (objectives) determines welfare criteria, and under each criterion, 
the importance of relevant institutional factors is determined.13 When feedback influences 
are considered, where factors in each level in the hierarchy can influence and be influenced 
by factors in other levels, a network is formed. Both the hierarchy and the network used in 
the survey are shown in the Appendix.  
Table 2 
Results of Field Survey: For Group in Hierarchy Model 
 
As displayed in Table 2, with the exception of two regions, Jambi and Banjarmasin, 
results from the group survey indicate that people’s participation (P) is generally ranked 
highest among factors that determine the welfare effect of local capture. Notice that for 
 
12 Although at the beginning popular demand for decentralization was not strong enough to push for an immediate change, 
for purely political reasons, the Indonesian government proceeded with a big-bang decentralization in 1999 (became operational 
in 2001). The mixed results in terms of post-decentralization performance make Indonesia suitable for model validation. The 
country managed to avoid a chaotic situation despite the abrupt change, and some regions have enjoyed the benefits of the policy. 
Yet, the resulting outcome in other regions has been disappointing, not according to what the theory suggests.  
13 The AHP uses relative measurements (ratio scales) derived from paired comparisons. Ratio scales are a fundamental kind 
of number amenable to performing the basic arithmetic operations of addition and subtraction within the same scale, 
multiplication and division of different scales, and combining the two operations by meaningfully weighting and adding different 
scales to obtain a unidimensional scale. Hence, they are very useful not only for capturing perceptions towards welfare criteria 
and institutional factors, but also for synthesizing the priority results that requires some arithmetic operations.  
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Palu, the least developed among seven regions, the second most important factor after 
participation is not the availability of local budget (F), but instead the initial welfare 
condition (S). This is consistent with the premise that the persistence of a poor region is 
caused by the low initial condition (path dependence). Similarly, for the relatively well-to-
do region, Malang, the second most important factor is also the initial welfare condition. 
While Malang is already developed (higher S), all factors, including participation, tend to 
result in a “positive local capture,” reinforcing the region’s welfare condition. Perception 
of respondents in that region corroborate the hypothesis.   
Table 3 
Results of Field Survey: For Group, Individuals, and Combined in Hierarchy Model 
 
All seven regions combined, the ranking shows that participation is indeed the most 
critical factor (the weight being 0.436 using Super Decision, and 0.443 using Expert 
Choice), followed by the size of local budget (0.329 and 0.319, respectively); see Table 
3.14 The ranking remains the same for the individuals category, the geometric means of 
which are shown in the second (middle) part of Table 3. When the results of group and 
individuals survey are combined, the weights for participation and local budget are 0.406 
and 0.324, respectively. 
 
14 Super Decision is an experimental software capable of calculating the super-matrix operations involved in the ANP-type 
of network. By removing the feedback components, it can produce a priority ranking similar to that based on AHP-type of 
hierarchy. Expert Choice, on the other hand, is specifically designed for AHP.  
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Table 4 
Sensitivity Analysis: Removing One Region at a Time for Group and Individuals 
 in the Hierarchy Model 
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The robustness of the results is tested by conducting two types of sensitivity analysis: 
dynamic analysis, and removing one region at a time. The first type is done for each set of 
questionnaires, the results of which indicate that the most sensitive factor for poverty is 
participation; for inequality is the initial welfare condition;, and for growth and HDI is the 
size of local budget. Thus, if local development needs to focus more on poverty alleviation, 
efforts have to be made to raise people’s participation. Field observations corroborate such 
a finding: the welfare effects of decentralization with local capture in regions where people 
are more politically aware and actively participate in various local development 
programmes tend to be more positive. The second sensitivity analysis reveals that in all 
cases, the superiority of participation (P) continues to hold (Table 4). The survey results 
are therefore fairly robust. 
Table 5 
Results of Field Survey: For Individuals in Network Model 
 
Unlike the case of the hierarchy model, results from the network model with feedback 
effects are mixed. For example, in Mataram and Bandung the geometric means point to 
participation being the most important, but for Jambi the size of local budget is the most 
important factor determining the welfare effect of decentralization (Table 5). Yet, when 
the three cases are combined, the geometric means ranks he size of local budget highest, 
followed by participation.  
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It is important to note,  that during the field survey the network model was applied only 
to individuals, not groups, and only a limited number of regions was covered.  Nonetheless, 
the fact that people’s participation (P) and the size of budget (F) stand out as important 
factors in explaining the welfare effect of decentralization confirms the IMD’s conjecture 
that quality and quantity factors jointly play an important role in the analysis of 
decentralization.    
Conclusions  
The focus of this paper is on how the interrelations among different dimensions of 
decentralization – fiscal, administrative and institutional – affect regional growth and 
welfare. By using the Institutional Model of Decentralization (IMD), it is first shown that 
when private benefits to local leaders exceeds social benefits, regional growth after 
decentralization may falter. That is, post-decentralization efficiency often predicted by the 
theory stays as an unrealized hypothesis. With widespread local capture occurring in many 
countries following political decentralization, the next question of interest is by  what 
mechanism can the effect of local capture on decentralization outcome be explained?  
By expanding the objective from growth to a more broadly-defined welfare, it is shown 
that the interactions among initial conditions, the effective size of the budget, people’s 
participation, and the quality of local leaders affects the way local capture influences 
regional welfare. The interactions are complex, non-linear, and may generate multiple 
equilibria. As the quality of local leaders, including their capacity to motivate participation, 
determines the outcome, a typology of leaders is constructed. Different types of self-
reinforcement factors dictate leader’s behaviour, this in turn can reinforce different 
outcomes, establishing the evolution between welfare and institution (implying 
endogenous institutions). Based on the sensitivity analysis, it is also conjectured that the 
nature and intensity of each factor’s role in different countries vary depending on the 
country’s social, political and economic structure.  
Applied to the case of seven regions in Indonesia, the theoretical prediction of IMD is 
substantiated. On the group category, given local capture, people’s participation is 
generally ranked the highest among factors that govern the welfare effect of 
decentralization. It plays the most critical role in reducing the capture while simultaneously 
maximizing the welfare The persistence of initial condition is also verified by the fact that 
it is ranked high, only in two extreme cases is it ranked  second, i.e., in the least developed 
(Palu) and very well-to-do region (Malang). In the latter, all factors including participation 
result in a “positive local capture,” reinforcing the region’s welfare condition. The survey 
also reveals that regions identified as “deteriorating” and having low participation tend to 
be poor, and they are persistently so. Not only does this corroborate the critical role of 
initial condition, but it also suggests that in a democratic system like Indonesia, 
decentralization is welfare-enhancing only for regions under “complete” progress, not for 
all regions.  
Given that a multiple equilibria scenario after decentralization is common, not unique 
for Indonesia, an institutional reform following a shift from centralized to decentralized 
system in any country is warranted; however, the reform ought to take account of the 
potential interactions among institutional factors and characteristics as described in IMD, 
not just aim at minimizing transaction costs. 
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Appendix: Brief Explanations of AHP and ANP 
Let A1, A2, A3, ..., An be n elements in a matrix within a hierarchy. The pairwise 
comparisons on pairs of elements (Ai, Aj) are represented by an n-by-n matrix A = (aij), 
where i,j = 1, 2, 3,....., n. Define a set of numerical weights w1, w2, w3, ......, wn that reflects 
the recorded comparisons,  
 
The scales used in the pairwise comparisons in AHP are based on Saaty’s scaling 
system (Saaty, 1996), i.e., from 1 to 9. Since every row is a constant multiple of the first 
row, A has a unit rank. By multiplying A with the vector of weights w,  
Aw = nw 
To recover the scale from the matrix ratios, the following system ought to be solved: 
(A-nI)w = 0 
Clearly, a nontrivial solution can be obtained  only if det(A-nI) vanishes, i.e., the 
characteristic equation of A.  Hence, n is an eigenvalue and w is an eigenvector of A. 
Given that A has a unit rank, all its eigenvalues except one are zero. Thus, the trace of A 
is equal to n. If each entry in A is denoted by aij, then aij = 1/aji (reciprocal property) holds, 
and so does ajk = aik / aij (consistency property). By definition, aii = ajj = 1, that is, when 
comparing two same elements. Therefore,  if we are to rank n number of elements, i.e., A 
is of the size n-by-n,  the required number of inputs from the paired comparisons is less 
than n2; it is equal only to the number of entries of the sub-diagona  part of A. Hence, if 
there are three elements in a particular level of a hierarchy, only three pairwise comparisons 
are required. In general,  the precise value of wi/wj is barely known, simply because the 
pairwise comparisons are only an estimate, suggesting that there are some perturbations. 
While the reciprocal property still holds, the consistency property  
does not. By taking the largest eigenvalue denoted by max , 
p
max
pp wwA    
where Ap is the actual, or the given, matrix (perturbed from matrix A). Solving the above 
gives a consistent matrix whose entries are wi/wj; it is a consistent estimate of A, although  
A1 A2 An
A1 w1/w1 w1/w2 w1/wn
A= .. .. .. .. ..
An wn/w1 wn/w2 wn/w
……………………….
……………………….
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Ap itself does not need to be consistent. Ap will be consistent if and only if max  = n. As 
long as the precise value of wj/wi cannot be given, which is common in real situations due 
to the bias in the comparisons, max  is always greater than or equal to n; hence, a measure 
of consistency can be derived based on the deviation of max  from n. When more 
than two elements are compared, the notion of consistency can be associated with 
transitivity condition: if A1  A2 and A2  A3, then A1  A3. It should be clear that in solving 
for w, the transitivity assumption is not strictly required; the inputted comparisons do not 
have to reflect a full consistency. Yet, as shown above, the resulting matrix and the 
corresponding vector remain consistent. It is this consistent vector w that reflects the 
priority ranking of the elements in each level. Hence, in a standard hierarchy with three 
levels (goals, criteria, and alternatives), the elements in each level are pairwise compared 
with respect to elements in the level above it, and the resulting vector at the bottom level 
reflects the priority ranking of the alternatives. 
Figure A1 
Role of Institutional Factors in Decentralization: Hierarchy Model 
 
To test the model framework for decentralization using AHP, the hierarchy shown in 
Figure A1 is used. Maximizing local welfare is the goal, and four indicators are identified: 
poverty, inequality, local output growth (GRDP growth), and human development index 
(HDI). These indicators are to be prioritized by using pairwise comparison matrix from 
which the eigen-vector reflecting the consistent ranking is derived. After clarifying 
whether in the respective region, each of the indicators has improved or not, the next step 
is to rank the importance of the determinants of those welfare indicators. As discussed 
before, of all possible determinants, three stand out: people’s participation (P), initial 
condition (S), and size of local budget (F). By taking into account the consistent ranking 
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of welfare indicators and institutional factors, the overall results can be synthesized. In 
some regions, a modified structure of the ANP-type of network is used in which feedback 
effects capturing the performance of each factor (improved or not improved) are identified. 
Unlike AHP, a network model recognizes two-way dependence relationships that exist 
among variables). With feedback, the alternatives can depend on the criteria as in a 
hierarchy but they may also depend on each other. The criteria themselves can depend on 
the alternatives and on each other. Hence, it involves a network rather than a hierarchy. 
With such a feature, the results are more stable because one considers the influence on and 
survival in the face of other influences.  
Figure A2 
Role of Institutional Factors in Decentralization: Network Model 
 
The network framework used in the survey is shown in Figure A2. Notice that the 2-
way arrows indicate the feedback effects between the bottom level and the level above it, 
and between some elements in the same level (size of local budget and initial welfare 
condition influence participation).  
While in a hierarchy-based model a set of pairwise comparison matrices are used, the 
presence of feedback influences in a network model requires a supermatrix that contains a 
set of sub—matrices. This supermatrix should capture the influence of elements in a 
network on other elements in that network.  Denoting a cluster by Ch, h = 1, ……m, and 
assuming that it has nh elements eh1, eh2, eh3 ……., ehmh, Figure A3 shows the supermatrix 
of such a hierarchy:  
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Figure A3 
Supermatrix of a Hierarchy 
 
Figure A4 
Supermatrix of a Holarchy 
 
When the bottom level affects the top level of the hierarchy, a form of network known 
as holarchy is formed, the supermatrix of which will look like the one displayed in Figure 
A4. Notice that the entry in the last row and column of the supermatrix in Figure A3 is the 
identity matrix I corresponding to a loop at the bottom level of the hierarchy. This is a 
necessary aspect of a hierarchy viewed in the context of supermatrix. On the other hand, 
the entry in the first row and last column of a holarchy in Figure A4 is nonzero, indicating 
that the top level depends on the bottom level. The entries of sub-matrices in Wij  are the 
ratio scales derived from paired comparisons performed on the elements within the clusters 
themselves according to their influence on each element in another cluster (outer 
dependence) or elements in their own cluster (inner dependence). The resulting unweighted 
supermatrix is then transformed into a matrix, each of whose columns sums to unity to 
generate a stochastic supermatrix. The derived weights are used to weight the elements of 
the corresponding column blocks (cluster) of the supermatrix, resulting in a weighted 
supermatrix, which is also stochastic. The stochastic nature is required for the reasons 
described below. The typical entry of Figure A5 supermatrix is shown in Figure A6. 
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Figure A5 
Supermatrix of a Network 
 
Figure A6 
Entry in the Supermatrix of a Network 
 
Since an element can influence the second element directly and indirectly through its 
influence on some third element and then by the influence of the latter on the second, every 
such possibility of a third element must be considered. This is captured by squaring the 
weighted matrix;  however, the third element also influences the fourth, which in turn 
influences the second. These influences can be obtained from the cubic power of the 
weighted supermatrix. As the process is performed continuously, one will have an infinite 
sequence of influence matrices denoted by Wk, k = 1,2……… The question is, if one takes 
the limit of the average of a sequence of N of these powers of the supermatrix, will the 
result converge, and, is the limit unique? It has been shown that such a limit exists given 
the stochastic nature of the weighted supermatrix (Saaty, 2001). There are three cases to 
consider in deriving Wk: (1) max = 1 is a simple root and there are no other roots of unity 
in which case given the nonnegative matrix W is primitive, we have limk→∞  
Wk = weT , implying that it is sufficient to raise the primitive stochastic matrix W to large 
powers to yield the limit outcome; (2) there are other roots of unity that cause cycling, in 
which case Cesaro sum is applied; and (3) max = 1 is a multiple root, in which case 
Sylvester’s formula with max = 1 is applied. For further details, see Saaty (2001) and Azis 
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(2009). In practice, one simply needs to raise the stochastic supermatrix to large powers to 
read off the final priorities in which all the columns of the matrix are identical and each 
gives the relative priorities of the elements from which the priorities of the elements in 
each cluster are normalized to one. The powers of the supermatrix do not converge unless 
it is stochastic, because then its largest eigenvalue is one. When a convergence fails to 
achieve (a cyclic case), the average of the successive matrices of the entire cycle gives the 
final priorities (Cesaro sum), in which the limit cycles in blocks and the different limits are 
summed, averaged and again normalized to one for each cluster. At any rate, raising the 
stochastic supermatrix to large powers gives what is known as limiting supermatrix. Hence, 
there are three supermatrices to be used: (1) the original unweighted supermatrix of column 
eigenvectors obtained from pair wise comparison matrices of elements; (2) the weighted 
supermatrix in which each block of column eigenvectors belonging to a cluster is weighted 
by the priority of influence of that cluster, rendering the weighted supermatrix column 
stochastic; and (3) the limiting supermatrix obtained by raising the weighted supermatrix 
to large powers. To apply the network model, our survey team used Super Decision 
software, and for the hierarchy model, the team used Super Decision and Expert Choice.   
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